William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 26 | Issue 4

Article 12

2000

A Survey of Recent Developments in the Law:
Constitutional Law
Mary L. Senkbeil

Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
Recommended Citation
Senkbeil, Mary L. (2000) "A Survey of Recent Developments in the Law: Constitutional Law," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 26:
Iss. 4, Article 12.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol26/iss4/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law

Senkbeil: A Survey of Recent Developments in the Law: Constitutional Law

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL TRENDS: THE NEW MAJORITY LIMITS
CONGRESS' POWER TO ABROGATE STATE SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY

A.

Introduction

In the past year, the Supreme Court revisited its interpretation
of state sovereign immunity. Only eleven years ago, the Court
issued an opinion broadly construing Congress' power to override
states' immunity to suit.' More recently a new majority' has begun
to reign in and overrule prior decisions while expounding on the
history of federalism. In finding its federalist principles, the Court
now narrowly construes Congress' power to override state
immunity from suit under the framework of the Constitution and
the Fourteenth Amendment.
This paper attempts to give the reader an understanding of
how the new majority evaluated state sovereign immunity claims in
the past year by first providing the framework the Court utilized
and then analyzing the Court's recent decisions.3 The framework
consists of understanding the Court's meaning of federalism under
the framework of the Constitution, the effect of the Fourteenth
Amendment on immunity, and the enactment and scope of the
Eleventh Amendment. Additionally, understanding the Court's
prior decisions is helpful to demonstrate the Court's new trend,
explained in the next section.4 Finally, the Eighth Circuit Court of
1. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
2. The new majority consists of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120
S. Ct. 631 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999); College Sav. Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999); Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199
(1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
3. This article does not attempt to provide a full history of sovereign
immunity or its numerous aspects. It focuses only on those relevant aspects of the
Court's decisions on sovereign immunity in the past year.
4. See infra Part E.
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Appeals issued an illuminating decision showing how the circuits
may apply the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decisions.5
B. State Sovereign Immunity in the Design of the Constitution and the
FourteenthAmendment
1.

ConstitutionalDesign

The essence of American federalism is the concept of divided
sovereignty.6 With the adoption of the Constitution, enumerated
powers national in nature were given to the national (federal)
government, while the states retained power in areas of local
concern.7 When the federal government exercises those general,
or enumerated powers, it's acts are supreme over all objects of its
lawful government. s However, states retain supreme sovereign9
authority in all other matters not subject to national control.
Under federalism, Congress must treat states in a "manner
consistent with their status as residuary sovereigns and joint
participants in the governance of the Nation."
Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, the states made clear

5.

See Alsbrook v. City of Maumellle, 184 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1999).

6. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2269 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining the
meaning of federalism).
7.

See JAMES MADISON TO THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE CONSTITUTION EXPLAINED
DIGRESSION' ON A DEFEATED PROPOSAL (OcT.
24, 1787), reprinted in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION PART ONE, at 193-94
(Bernard Baily ed., Literary Classics of the United States, Inc. 1993) (1787)
[hereinafter DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION PART ONE] (explaining that the new

AND JUSTIFIED, WITH AN 'IMMODERATE

Constitution was designed to give the federal government "every power requisite
for general purposes and leave to the states every power which might be most
beneficially administered by them").
8. See THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 284-85 (James Madison) (Benjamin
Fletcher Wright ed., 1972).
In this paper, Madison explains the difference
between a "national" and "federal" government. Under a national government, he
states, the central government has "indefinite supremacy over all persons and
things, so far as they are objects of lawful government." Id. at 284. If the nation
were a consolidation of the people, supremacy would be "completely vested in the
national legislature."
Id. at 284-85. Under the federal form of government
created by the Constitution, "communities united for particular purposes," part of
the sovereignty rests in the central government and part rests in the "local" state

government. Id. at 285.
9. See id. at 284-85. Madison explained that the states "form distinct and
independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective
spheres, to the general authority, than the general authority is subject to them,
within its own sphere." Id. at 285.

10.

Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2263.
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that they retained sovereignty and independence not "expressly
delegated to the United States"" in the Articles of Confederation.
When the new Constitution was proposed, maintaining sovereignty
in the new government was a matter of great concern among the
states.' 2 The members of the Constitutional Convention attempted
to allay states' concerns that they would no longer retain any power
under the new government. 13 Through the state conventions and
11.

U.S. Articles of Confederation, art. II, reprinted in GREAT BooKs OF THE
WORLD, at 5 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952) (1781). This Article
states: "[e]ach state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every
power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly
delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled." Id.
12. See, e.g., OLIVER ELLSWORTH, CONNECTICUT RATIFYING CONVENTION (JAN. 7,
1788), reprinted in DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION PART ONE, at 882-83 (attempting
to allay fears about the sovereign relationship between national and state
governments by comparing the relationship between state and municipal
governments each acting in their own spheres); WILLIAM FINDLEY, PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN

RATIFYING CONVENTION (DECEMBER 1, 1787), reprinted in DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITUTION PART ONE, at 818-19 (expressing his belief that state sovereignty will
no longer exist if the Constitution is adopted; GEORGE MASON, VIRGINIA RATIFYING
CONVENTION (JUNE 1788), reprinted in DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION PART Two, at

725-26 (Bernard Baily ed., Literary Classics of the United States, Inc. 1993) (1788)
[hereinafter DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION PART Two] (questioning the power of
the federal government to bring a state into court at the Virginia Convention);
MELANCTON SMITH, NEW YORK RATIFYING CONVENTION (JULY 1788), reprinted in
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION PART Two, at 841-42 (questioning how there could

be two supreme powers in one government and advocating retained state power);
SAMUEL SPENCER, NORTH CAROLINA RATIFYING CONVENTION (JULY 25, 1788), reprinted

in DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION PART TWO, at 854 (expressing concern that the

state governments would be "swallowed up by the great mass of powers given to
Congress").
13. See supra note 12; see also JAMES WILSON, SPEECH AT A PUBLIC MEETING,
PHILADELPHIA, (OCT. 6, 1787 ), reprintedin DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION PART ONE,

at 66-67 (arguing the Constitution is not calculated, as feared, to reduce state
governments to "mere corporations or annihilate them); THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at
128 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1972) ("The proposed
Constitution, so far from implying an abolition of the State governments, makes
them constituent parts of the national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct
representation in the Senate, and leaves in their possession certain exclusive and
very important portions of sovereign power."); THE FEDERALIST No. 14, at 152
(james Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1972) (explaining the
constitutional convention's creation of a national government was not intended to
abolish states governments, but rather the national government is limited to
'certain enumerated objects, which concern all the members of the republic"
while the states "retain their due authority and activity"); THE FEDERALIST No. 32,
at 241 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1972) (explaining
the proposed Constitution "aims only at a partial union or consolidation, the State
governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before
had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the United States");
THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 247 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
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debates in the press, the Constitution's creators made clear the
national government created by the Constitution could not usurp
state power and sovereignty. 14 In creating a national "federal
government" under the Constitution, the states were made
"constituent parts of the national sovereignty" 15 while leaving "in
their possession certain exclusive and very important portions of
sovereign power."16 One essential attribute of sovereignty the states
retained was the right not to be hailed into court without consent."
In The Federalist No. 32, Hamilton explained that the
Constitution required states to relinquish sovereignty in only three
cases: 1) where the power is expressly granted solely in the national
government; 2) where the power is granted to the national
government in one section and prohibits the state from exercising
like power in another section; and 3) where the authority is
granted to the national government and exercise of the same
authority would be "absolutely and totally contradictory and
repugnant." " Hamilton stated further that it is only when national
government acts pursuant to its Constitutional authority those acts
are the supreme law of the land. 9 Thus, the national government
2
can not legitimately act to usurp state authority or sovereignty. 0
2.

The FourteenthAmendment

The Fourteenth Amendment requires states to surrender part
ed., 1972) (explaining that acts by a national government "which are not pursuant
to its constitutional powers" but rather invasion of the residual state powers cannot
be considered the supreme law of the land).
14. See supranotesl2-13 and accompanying text.
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 128 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher
Wright ed., 1972).
16. Id.
17. SeeAlden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2262 (1999).
18. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 241 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin
Fletcher Wright ed., 1972).
19. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 247 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin
Fletcher Wright ed., 1972) (explaining supremacy is confined to "laws made
pursuant to the Constitution").
20. See id. at 246-47. Hamilton explained that if the national legislature
attempted to vary the laws of the states, the legislature exceeds its authority and
infringes on the state. See id. These laws are not made pursuant to the national
government's constitutional powers and cannot be said to become supreme law of
the land. See THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 285 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher
Wright ed., 1972) (stating the national government's jurisdiction extends only to
the areas enumerated in the Constitution while the states retain a "residuary and
inviolable sovereignty over all other objects") (emphasis added).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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of their sovereignty and gives Congress the right to authorize
22
private suits against states under its enforcement power.
The Fourteenth Amendment's explicit limits on states' powers
and the grant of Congressional power to enforce the rights
contained therein, "fundamentally altered the balance of state and
federal power struck by the Constitution."2 3 When Congress enacts
appropriate legislation to enforce this Amendment, federal
interests are paramount, and Congress may assert an authority over
the states that would be otherwise unauthorized by the
Constitution.24
C.

The Eleventh Amendment

Only five years after the Constitution was adopted, and with
assurances that states would not have to relinquish sovereign
immunity, the Supreme Court held that the literal text of Article
25
III authorized a private citizen of one state to sue another state
27
26
The Court opined in Chisholm v. Georgia
without its consent.
that, read literally, Article III gave the judiciary power to hear cases
and controversies "between a State and Citizens of another State,"
and "between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens, or Subjects." 28 The decision "fell upon the country with a
profound shock." 29 The day after the Court announced the
decision, a proposal to amend the Constitution overruling the
decision was introduced in the House of Representatives." In the
next session, the Eleventh Amendment was introduced in the
Senate." After near unanimous passage, the Eleventh Amendment

22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. In this regard, the Court in Alden found
federal interests are controlling when Congress enacts appropriate legislation
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, Congress may exercise authority
over the states under the Fourteenth Amendment even though it was otherwise
unauthorized by the Constitution. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267.
23. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996).
24. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
25. See U.S. CONST. art. III (setting forth the power given to the judiciary
under the Constitution).
26. See generally Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 419-20.
29. Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2250 (1999) (quoting 1 C. WARREN, THE
SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATEs HIsTORY 96 (rev. ed. 1926)).
30. See id.
31. See id.
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was ratified in 1795.32

As passed, the Eleventh Amendment states "[t]he Judicial
Power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.",3
Although the Eleventh
Amendment does not literally bar suits against states by a citizen of
its own state, the Court in Hans v. Louisiana3 refused to read the
amendment literally. 35 Reflecting on the situation under which the
Eleventh Amendment was adopted, the Court in Hans stated:
Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment was
adopted, it was understood to be left open for citizens of a
State to sue their own state in the federal courts, whilst the
idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of foreign states,
was indignantly repelled? Suppose that Congress, when
proposing the Eleventh Amendment, had appended to it
a proviso that nothing therein contained should prevent a
State from being sued by its own citizens in cases arising
under the Constitution or the laws of the United States,
can we imagine that the States would have adopted it?
The supposition that it would is almost an absurdity on its
face. 6
Rather, the Eleventh Amendment was designed to overrule the
Court's decision in Chisholm and make clear that state sovereign
immunity was inherent in the Constitution. 7
D. Supreme CourtDecisions After the Eleventh Amendment Interpreting
State Immunity Priorto 1999
8
In Pardenv. Terminal Railway of Alabama State Docks Department,3
the Court interpreted Congress' Article I enforcement power as
Congressional authority to subject states to private suits by its own
citizens under the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA) and
achieve other objectives within the scope of the enumerated

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

See id.
U.S. CONST. amend XI.
134 U.S. 1 (1890).
See id. at 13.
Id. at 14-15.
See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2251.
377 U.S. 184 (1964).
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39

powers.
The Court held that if a state voluntarily operated a
railroad,
an
act regulated
by Congress, it would be subject to suit by
•
.
40
injured workers.
The Court reasoned that states who chose to
enter the railroad business after the enactment of the statute
impliedly waived their sovereign immunity from such suits.4 ' This
42

was true even though the statute did not specifically refer to states
The Court
and the state expressly disavowed such waiver.
explained:
By enacting the FELA... Congress conditioned the right
to operate a railroad in interstate commerce upon
amenability to suit in federal court as provided by the Act;
by thereafter operating a railroad in interstate commerce,
Alabama must be taken to have accepted
that condition
44
and thus to have consented to suit.

Following Parden, a plurality of the Court in Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co.4 5 concluded "States consented to suits against them
based on congressionally created causes of action" when they
approved the Constitution's Commerce Clause. 6 The Court placed
one restriction on its holding in Parden: It would "find waiver only
where stated by the most express language or by such
overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave no room
for any other reasonable construction. 4 7
48

In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the Court began pulling

in the reigns of its prior decisions and re-examining "federalism."
In Seminole Tribe, the Court overruled Union Gas and made it clear
Congress lacked power under the Commerce Clause or any other

39.
40.

See id. at 192.
See id. Specifically, the Court held that by ratifying and adopting the

Commerce Clause power in the Constitution, states gave Congress the power to
create private causes of action against them. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 185 (citing the FELA, which included states under the general
provision subjecting to suit every "common carrier by railroad... engaging in
commerce between ... the several States").
43.

See id. at 194 (holding that Alabama had waived its immunity from FELA

suit even though Alabama law expressly disavowed such waiver).
44. Id. at 192.
45. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
46. See id. at 22.
47. Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974).
48. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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Article I powe 9 to abrogate states' sovereign immunity from suits
commenced or prosecuted in federal courts.
Congress may still abrogate state sovereign immunity under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Before the Court's 1997 decision in
City of Boerne v. Flores,5" this power was substantial.
Boerne
announced the "congruence" and "proportionality" test to decide
whether52 Congress validly exercised its Fourteenth Amendment
power. To enact "appropriate" legislation under the Boerne test,
Congress "must identify unconstitutional conduct protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment's substantive provisions and tailor its
'
legislation to remedy or prevent such conduct. "s
With this
background, the new majority has now further restricted Congress'
power to subject states to suit under both Article I and the
Fourteenth Amendment.
E. Recent Supreme Court Decisions-TheNew Majority Follows A New
Trend
In the past year, the Court has held states are not subject to
suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) ,5 the Patent
Remedy Act (PRA), 55 the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act
(TRCA)5 6 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) . Seminole Tribe and Boerne became the springboard for the
new majority's view of state sovereign immunity. Congress may not
abrogate a state's right to be free from suit absent a showing that
the suit is for purposes of carrying out the goals of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Even then, the legislative record must contain

49. The Court rejected petitioner's argument in Alden for the same reason.
See Alden v. Maine,119 S. Ct. 2240, 2256 (1999).
50. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73.

51.

521 U.S. 507 (1997).

52. See id. at 520 ("There must be congruence and proportionality between
the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.").
53. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank,
119 S.Ct. 2199, 2207 (1999) (emphasis added).
54. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994).

55.

29 U.S.C. § 202 (1994).

56. 15 U.S.C. § 1122 (1994).
57. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
58. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2266 (1999) (holding Congress
cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity under Article I of the Constitution); see
also Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S.Ct. 631, 643 (2000) (stating Congress'
power under the Fourteenth Amendment is limited to enforcing its goals, not
defining them).
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evidence of widespread unconstitutional conduct committed by the
states. 59 Finally, unconstitutional conduct is determined in relation
to the state's authority to legislate in the particular area covered by
the Fourteenth Amendment. ° Following the reasoning laid down
in these decisions, the Eighth Circuit recently held Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act is also an unconstitutional
61
abrogation of state sovereignty.
1. Alden v. Maine: CongressionalAction Under Article I Cannot
Subject States to Suits in Their Own Courts
In Alden v. Maine,62 a case of first impression, the Court held
that Congress may not use its power under Article I of the
63
Constitution to authorize private suits against states in state court.
In 1938, Congress passed the FLSA under its Article I Commerce
Clause power. Congress later amended the Act to include states
in the definition of "employer" and thus allowed individuals to sue
states for violations of federal wage laws. 65 In 1992, a group of
probation officers sued their employer, the State of Maine, in
federal ••district
court for violations of the FLSA's overtime
66
provisions.
Maine claimed that the FLSA's provision allowing
private suits against states was an unconstitutional attempt to
67
abrogate states' sovereign immunity.
The district court dismissed the action, holding the Supreme
Court's decision in Seminole Tribe68 made it clear that Congress
lacked power under the Commerce Clause, or any other Article I
power, to abrogate states' •sovereign 69immunity from suits
commenced or prosecuted in federal courts. The employees then
70
filed suit in Maine's state court asserting the same cause of action.
The Maine Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the suit holding
sovereign immunity barred the FLSA's provisions authorizing
59. See Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 645 (explaining widespread evidence is required to
meet the proportionality test in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)).
60. See infra note 180.
61. SeeAlsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1999).
62. 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
63. See id. at 2246.
64. See 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1994).
65. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d), 203(e) (2) (C) (1994).
66. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2246.
67. See id.
68. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
69. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2246.
70. See id.
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private actions against states in their own courts, without regard to
consent. 7 The probation officers appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court.7 2

The Court first set forth the standard under which it would
review state immunity questions.
Examining the concept of
federalism, the Court concluded the federal balance inherent in
the Constitution (which the Eleventh Amendment restored) gives
states immunity from civil suits without consent. 73
This
presumption in favor of sovereign immunity can only be overcome
by showing "compelling evidence" that the design of the
Constitution required states to surrender their immunity to
Congress. 4
a.

The Supremacy Clause

Alden argued the Supremacy Clause 75 automatically overrides
state sovereign immunity when Congress enacts legislation
subjecting states to suit. 76 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
agreed that legislation enacted by Congress is the supreme law of
the land, but explained the Supremacy Clause only gives force to
those federal laws that are in accord with the design of the
77
separation of powers in the Constitution. That is, the enactment
of a federal law by itself does not override states' sovereign
immunity, the federal law must be a "valid exercise of the national
power. " 7 Substantive federal law only overrides state sovereign
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 2254. (finding support for this argument in the text and history
of the Eleventh Amendment.) The text of the Eleventh Amendment gives
direction to the judiciary, stating its judicial power "shall not be construed to
extend" to suits by citizens against states. See id. at 2251 (emphasis added). Thus,
the Court argued, the Eleventh Amendment only restores the original federal
balance within the Constitution. See id.
74.
Id. at 2255.
75. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. The Supremacy Clause provides:
[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme law of the land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the
Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
76.
77.
78.

SeeAlden, 119 S. Ct. at 2255.
See id.
Id.
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immunity when it is implemented "in a manner consistent with the
constitutional sovereignty of the states." 79
b.

The Necessary and PraperClause

Next, the Court considered whether Congress could abrogate
immunity under the Necessary and Proper Clause.8 0 The Court
rejected the idea that this clause authorizes Congress to subject
states to suit "as a means of achieving objectives otherwise within
the scope of the enumerated powers."8' The Court noted that
although some of its decisions endorsed that contention, those
cases were overruled. 82 Further, laws enacted to carry out Congress'
Article I power that violate the principle of state sovereignty are not
proper or valid laws, but "act[s] of usurpation which deserve to be
treated as such. ",1

Thus, the Court held, based on the "history,

practice, precedent, and the structure of the Constitution....
states retain immunity from private suit in their own courts, an
immunity beyond the congressional power to abrogate by Article I
legislation."8"

However, there are limits on state sovereign immunity s" States
cannot "disregard the Constitution or valid federal law" that
"comport[s] with the constitutional design. , 6 The Court noted
"sovereign immunity bars suits only in the absence of consent" and
many states have consented to suits on their own initiative."'
79. Id. at 2255-56.
80. See id. at 2256. The Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress
"[t]o make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution
in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
81. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2256.
82. See id. at 2256. (citing Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. Docks Dep't, 277
U.S. 184 (1964) and Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 495 U.S. 1 (1989), as
endorsing the contention that the Necessary and Proper Clause authorized
Congress to abrogate state immunity and stating that cases have been overruled by
College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct.
2219 (1999) and Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) respectively).
83. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2256 (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,
923-24 (1997)).
84. Id. at 2266.
85. See id. at 2267. (noting that states' sovereign immunity does extend to
governmental entities that are not an "arm of the State"). Nor does sovereign
immunity bar all suits against state officers for declaratory or injunctive relief
where the real party in question is in fact the individual and not the state. See id.
86. Id. at 2266 (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 2267 (noting that states have "enacted statutes consenting to a wide
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Additionally, states have consented to suits brought by other states
or the Federal Government bX ratifying the Constitution."" Further,
the Fourteenth Amendment 9 requires states to surrender part of
their sovereignty and gives Congress the right to authorize private
suits against states under the Amendment's Enforcement Clause.9 °
The FLSA, enacted under the Commerce Clause pursuant to
Article I, met none of these exceptions and was therefore an
improper exercise of Congress' power to abrogate state immunity.
2. College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board: The Scope of the FourteenthAmendment
and the Death of the Constructive Waiver Doctrine
In College Savings Bank v. Florida PrepaidPostsecondaryEducation
92
Expense Board,91 the Court struck down a provision in the TRCA
that permitted suits against states under the Lanham Act 93 for
alleged misrepresentation. 94
College Savings Bank (College
Savings) marketed and sold CollegeSure certificates of deposit
designed to finance college education costs.9 College Savings held96
a patent on the administration methodology of its certificates.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board (Florida
Prepaid), an arm of the State of Florida, also administered a tuition
prepayment program. 97
College Savings Bank sued Florida Prepaid under the TRCA
for alleged misstatements about its program and for patent
infringement. 9s Florida Prepaid moved to dismiss the complaint
variety of suits").
88. See id.
89. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
90. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. In this regard, the Court found federal
interests controlling when Congress enacts appropriate legislation under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and Congress may exercise authority over the states
otherwise unauthorized by the Constitution. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267.
91. 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
92. 15 U.S.C. § 1122 (1994). The TRCA allows suits against states brought
under § 43(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946 (the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a)) for false and misleading advertising. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at
2222.
93. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994).
94. See FloridaPrepaid, 119 S.Ct. 2219, 2219 (1999).
95. See id. at 2223.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id. The Court addressed the patent infringement action separately, in
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct.
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claiming sovereign immunity. 99 College Savings argued that Florida
Prepaid constructively waived its immunity by engaging in
"interstate marketing and administration" of its program in
commerce.100
College Savings also argued Congress validly
abrogated Florida Prepaid's sovereign immunity because Congress
enacted the TRCA to enforce the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 0'
a. FourteenthAmendment Due Process
College Savings contended the TRCA was enacted to remedy
and prevent states from depriving persons of two property rights
without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.1°' The Court noted the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that no state shall deprive any person of "property...
without due process of law"'0 and gives Congress "power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."0 4
Legislation enacted under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
held, must be "carefully delimited remediation or prevention of
constitutional violations."'
The Court's decision turned on the definition of "property"
within the Fourteenth Amendment.10 6 If the object of the
legislation was not "property" within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, then that legislation
could not be a valid exercise of Congressional power under the
Fourteenth Amendment.0 7 College Savings contended the TRCA
protected its property right to "be free from a business competitor's
false advertising about its own product." 0 8 The Court rejected this

argument, finding the right to be free from a business competitor's
false advertising concerning its own product is not a property
right.'09 Property interests, the court stated, have a common

2119 (1999), an opinion issued the same day.
99. See FloridaPrepaid,119 S. Ct. at 2224.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).
104. See id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5).
105. See id.
106. See id. at 2224-25.
107. See id.
108. Id. at 2224.
109. See id.
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feature of exclusion."0 Since Florida Prepaid's statements about its
own products did not intrude on any interest over which College
Savings had exclusive control, that interest was not a property right
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
College Savings next claimed its right to be secure in its
business interests was a property interest protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
The Court found
this argumentjust as specious.1 3 While business assets are property
in the ordinary sense of the word, the Court found the activity of
doing business is not a property interest." 4 The Court explained
the only rights impinged on by false
advertising are the activities of
f] 115
doing business or making a profit.
Because these interests are
not property interests, the Due Process Clause does not protect
116
them.
Thus, because this legislation
was not
"necessary to
,117
--prevent violation of the Fourteenth Amendment," Congress did
not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity when it enacted the
TRCA.118

b.

Waiver

The Court next considered whether Florida Prepaid waived its
sovereign immunity."9 Waiver, the Court explained, will generally
be found "either if the State voluntarily invokes our jurisdiction...
or... if the State makes a 'clear declaration' that it intends to
submit itself to our jurisdiction.'

20

The Court found that Florida

Prepaid did not expressly waive its consent to be sued since it did
not voluntarily invoke the Court's jurisdiction or make a clear
declaration 121that it intended to submit itself to federal
jurisdiction.

College Savings then argued that if Florida Prepaid did not
expressly waive sovereign immunity, it did so "impliedly" or

110.

See id.

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See id. at 2224-25.
See id. at 2225.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 2233.
See id. at 2225-26.
Id. at 2226.
See id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol26/iss4/12

14

20001

Senkbeil: A Survey of Recent Developments in the Law: Constitutional Law
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

1249

"constructively" under the Supreme Court's decision in Parden v.
TerminalRailway of Alabama Docks Department.122 Specifically, College
Savings contended that Florida Prepaid should be subject to suit
because it engaged in a nonessential and voluntary activity of
selling and advertising a for-profit educational investment after
being put on notice that it would be subject to suit under the
TRCA.
Under Parden and its progeny, College Savings argued,
constructive waiver is appropriate and should be recognized where
Congress unambiguously provides the state will be subject to suit if
it "engages in certain specified conduct governed by federal
regulation" and the state voluntarily elects "to
engage in the
124
federally related conduct that subjects it to suit."

The Court flatly rejected this argument and overruled its prior
holding in Parden, stating "[w]e think that the constructive-waiver
experiment of Parden was ill conceived, and see no merit in
'
attempting to salvage any remnant of it."125
Parden, the Court
stated, is "an anomaly in the jurisprudence of sovereign immunity"
which broke sharply with cases before it and is "fundamentally
incompatible with later ones. 126 Because the Court could not
harmonize the holding in Parden with the requirement set forth in
later cases• that
states' express waiver of sovereign immunity be
127
unequivocal and the finding that no other constitutional right
can be surrendered by constructive
consent, 12 it expressly
129
overruled whatever remained of Parden.
Because Florida Prepaid did not waive immunity by engaging
in activity regulated under the TRCA and Congress did not validly
abrogate state sovereign immunity by enacting the TRCA, the
Supreme Court found the federal courts lacked jurisdiction to hear

122.

See id. (citing Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. Docks Dep't., 377 U.S. 184

(1964)).
123. See id. at 2228.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See id. (noting that "requiring a 'clear declaration' by the State of its
waiver.., to be certain that the State in fact consents to suit" is inconsistent with
an unequivocal declaration by Congress of its intention to subject a State to suit if
that State takes certain action).
128. See id. at 2229 (finding state sovereign immunity is a constitutional right
and noting no other constitutional rights have ever been held to be impliedly or
constructively waived).
129. See id. at 2228.
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30
the matter and affirmed the dismissal.

3. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board
v. College Savings Bank: Defining "Appropriate"Legislation Under
the FourteenthAmendment
In a companion case, Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 3 1 the Supreme Court rejected3
the notion that Florida Prepaid could be sued under the PRA.11
Congress passed the PRA in 1990 to make it clear that states were
subjectplan
to suit
in federal ,'33court for "infringement of patents and
varety
plant variety protections."
College Savings owned a patent for
the financing methodology it used in its CollegeSure certificates of
deposit' 4 and alleged Florida Prepaid infringed on that patent in
connection with its tuition prepayment program.135
The Court noted Congress passed the PRA under three
sources of constitutional authority: of the Patent Clause; 13' the
Interstate Commerce Clause;'37 and section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment.1 38 Relying on its previous decisions, the Court stated
Congress may not abrogate states' sovereign immunity under
Article I of the United States Constitution.139 Thus, it dismissed
College Saving's arguments that Congress validly exercised its
power under the Patent Clause and the Interstate Commerce
Clause. 14
College Savings instead argued Congress validly
exercised its power under section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment "to secure the Fourteenth Amendment's protections
141
against deprivations of property without due process of law."
The Court first stated Congress can only enact legislation that
is "appropriate"
under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth
1
142
Amendment.
"Appropriate" legislation under the Enforcement
Clause must be evaluated considering the Court's prior holding in
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See id. at 2233.
119 S.Ct. 2199 (1999).
See id. at 2202; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994).
See College Sav. Bank, 119 S.Ct. at 2203.
See id. at 2202.
See id.
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8,cl. 8.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2205.
See id.
See id. (citing Seminole Tribe v.Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996)).
See id.
See id. at 2206.
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Boerne.14

To enact legislation under the Enforcement Clause using
the Boerne test, Congress "must identify conduct transgressing the
Fourteenth Amendment's substantive provisions, and must144tailor its
legislative scheme to remedying or preventingsuch conduct.,
a.

Substantive Due Process

In the context of whether Congress validly enacted the PRA
under the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court questioned whether the PRA could be "viewed as remedial or
preventative legislation aimed at securing the protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment for patent owners."14 The Court stated its
first step was to "identify the... 'evil' or 'wrong' that Congress
intended to remedy." 146

It reasoned

the conduct Congress

attempted to redress by the PRA was the "unremedied patent
infringement by the States" for which patent owners were denied
compensation.

The Court then looked to the legislative record to find any
evidence that "unremedied patent infringement by states had
become a problem of national import."148 When Congress enacted

the PRA, it did not identify a pattern of patent infringement or
constitutional violations by the states.149 Rather, the House of
Representatives could only come up with two examples of patent
infringement suits against states, and the bill's sponsor conceded
there was no "evidence of massive or widespread violation of patent
50
laws by the States either with or without this State immunity.,
Noting "states are willing and able to respect patent rights"151 the
Court found the PRA was neither remedial nor preventative. 151

143. See id. (referring to City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)).
144. Id. at 2207 (emphasis added).
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. Id. at 2208.
149. See id. at 2207.
150. See id.
151. Id. (quoting Patent Remedy ClarificationAct: Hearing on H.R. 3886 before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration ofJustice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 56 (1990) (statement of William S.

Thompson)).
152.

See id. at 2210.
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ProceduralDue Process

College Savings next asserted the PRA was also designed to
safeguard procedural due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 5 ' It argued that when states infringe on a patent and
then plead immunity to a patent infringement suit, it "deprives the
patentee of property without due process of law.",5 4 Unlike the
trademark property rights asserted by College Savings in the TRCA
action, the Court acknowledged that patents
are property within
55
the meaning of the Due Process Clause.
Congress may legislate against deprivation of patent interests
under the Fourteenth Amendment's procedural due process
clause.156 However, the Court stated Congress may only enact
legislation "where the State provides no remedy, or only
inadequate remedies, to injured patent owners for...
infringement of their patent" because only then "could a
deprivation of property without due process result."' 57 In other
words, if the state has an adequate remedy no due process violation
will result. 58 Therefore, to abrogate state sovereign immunity
under procedural due process, Congress must first find states
159
provide no remedy or the remedies provided are inadequate.
Here, the Court found Congress "barely considered the availability
of state remedies for patent infringement ....11160
Under either substantive or procedural due process, the Court
found the PRA did not respond to a history of "widespread and
persisting deprivation of constitutional rights" of the type Congress
153. See id. at 2208.
154. See id. The Court ignored College Saving's argument that state immunity
from suit also violated the Just Compensation Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because the state "takes" the property in patent without providing
just compensation. See id.
155. See id. ("Patents... have long been considered a species of property.").
The Court rejected the argument that patents are merely property created by
virtue of Article I of the Constitution and thus not subject to protection under
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
156. See id. ("[I]f the Due Process Clause protects patents, we know of no
reason why Congress might not legislate against their deprivation without due
process under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. Id. at 2209. The Court noted several different causes of action may be
available against states in state courts, such as suits for deceit, unfair competition,
restitution, tort claims, conversion, takings or legislative remedies. See id. at 2208
nn.8, 9.
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previously faced in enacting legislation under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Enforcement Clause. 61
Noting Congress'
conclusion that states were depriving patent owners of property
without due process was based only on scant support in the record,
the Court ruled the indiscriminate scope of the PRA is "so out of
proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object [it] cannot
be understood as responsive
to, or designed to prevent,
6
unconstitutional behavior." 1
4. Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents: 63 Congress Cannot
Redefine States'Legal Obligations Under the FourteenthAmendment
In a consolidated suit in the current term, the Court held the
ADEA did not abrogate states' sovereign immunity. 164 Roderick
MacPherson and Marvin Narz sued their employer, the University
of Montevallo, in federal district court claiming age discrimination
in violation of the ADEA.165 Daniel Kimel, Jr., and a group of
current and former faculty and librarians also sued their employer,
Florida• State
University,166 in federal
district court for an alleged
.
..
violation of the ADEA.
Finally, Wellington Dickson sued his
employer, the Florida Department of Corrections, in federal
district court alleging a~e discrimination because his employer
failed to promote him.
All three defendants moved to dismiss
contending the Eleventh Amendment barred suit against them as
arms of the state.168
One district court found that "although the ADEA contains a
clear statement of Congress' intent to abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity, Congress did not enact or extend the
ADEA under its Fourteenth Amendment § 5 enforcement power"
and thus "did not abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment
immunity.

16
, 9

The

other

two district

courts held Congress

expressed its intent to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment
immunity when it enacted the ADEA, and the ADEA was a proper
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
salaries

Id. at 2210 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 526 (1997)).
Id. (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532).
120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
See id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
See id. at 638 (alleging the employer's refusal to allocate funds to adjust
had a disparate impact on the pay of older employees).

166.
167.

See id.
See id. at 639.

168.
169.

See id. at 638-39.
Id.at 638.
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exercise of Congress' authority under the Fourteenth
Amendment.'7
All three cases were appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and consolidated.71
In a divided opinion, one Eleventh Circuit judge found the
ADEA "does not abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment
immunity" under the Fourteenth Amendment because it lacked
"unmistakably clear language evidencing Congress' intent" to do
172
so.

Another judge found Congress lacked power under section

five of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state immunity
under the ADEA because "the ADEA confers rights far more
extensive than those the Fourteenth Amendment provides" and
was not enacted as a "proportional response to any widespread
violation of the elderly's constitutional rights."' Finding a conflict
among the federal appellate courts on the question of "whether the
ADEA validly abrogates the States' Eleventh Amendment
immunity," the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.17
a. Intent to Abrogate Must be UnequivocallyExpressed
In deciding the issue, the Court determined it must answer two
questions.' 75 First, it considered whether Congress "unequivocally
expressed its intent" to abrogate states' immunity when it made the
ADEA applicable to the states. 76 The Court easily answered this
question, applying a "simple but stringent test: 'Congress may
abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in
federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the
language of the statute."' '
Because Congress included state
governments and their political subdivisions in the definitions of
"employer" and "public agency" to which the statute applied, the
Court found Congress clearly expressed its intent to subject states
170. See id. at 638-39.
171. Seeid. at639.
172. Id. (explaining Judge Edmondson's decision in Kimel v. Florida Bd. of
Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1430 (11th Cir. 1998), afffd, 120 S. Ct. 631 (1999)).
173. See id. (explaining and quotingJudge Cox's decision).
174. See id. at 639-40 (surveying the cases and finding that while the Second,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have held the ADEA does validly
abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits
have held it does not).
175. See id. at 640.
176. See id. When enacted, the ADEA did not apply to the states. A 1974
Amendment to the FLSA, applicable to the ADEA, however, changed the
definition of "employer" to expressly include states. See id. at 637.
177. Id. at 640 (citations omitted).
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178
to suit under the ADEA.

b.

The FourteenthAmendment Analysis

The Court next turned to the question of whether Congress
"acted pursuant to a valid grant of Constitutional authority."' 9 If
Congress enacted the ADEA solely pursuant to its Commerce
Clause power, the Court held it would not have been a valid
exercise of power since Article I powers "do not include the power
to subject States to suit at the hands of private individuals." s If the
ADEA was also enacted pursuant to Congress' Fourteenth
Amendment power to abrogate states' sovereign immunity, the
question is whether the ADEA is appropriate legislation under the
Fourteenth Amendment.18 '
The Court examined only the
Fourteenth Amendment power.
Congress has the power to determine whether and what
legislation is needed to secure rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment, including authority to remedy and deter violations of
rights the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. 18
This power
includes prohibiting broader conduct than that forbidden by the
text of the Fourteenth Amendment to remedy and deter violations
of rights guaranteed by the Amendment.!8 3 Although Congress'
conclusions on whether and what conduct must be prohibited to
secure Fourteenth Amendment rights are entitled to much
deference, its power is limited in some important respects."' Most
notably, Congress cannot determine the substance of the Fourteenth
Amendment, "i]t has been given the power 'to enforce,' not the
85
power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.',
The interpretation and determination of substantive provisions of
178. See id.
179. Id.
180. See id. at 643. The Court recognized that it previously upheld the
constitutional validity of the 1974 extension of the ADEA as applicable to state and
local governments under Congress' Commerce Clause power. See id. at 643 (citing
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 (1983)). The Court then reviewed its more
recent decisions and stated "[u]nder ourfirmly establishedprecedent ...if the ADEA
rests solely on Congress' Article I commerce power, the private petitioners in
today's cases cannot maintain their suits against their state employers." Id. at 643
(emphasis added).
181. See id. at 644.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. Id. (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1996)).
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the Fourteenth Amendment are only for the judiciary to decide. s'
The Court recognized that the line between enacting
legislation to secure the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees and
determining the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment is a fine
one, and Congress has wide latitude to decide where the line lies.
The Court nevertheless examined the legislation to determine if
"congruence and proportionality" existed between the injury to be
prevented by the legislation and the means adopted toward that
end as dictated by Boerne. 187 The "congruence and proportionality"
test requires the Court to determine first if there is evidence of a
widespread pattern of constitutional violation by the states that the
legislation purports to remedy. 18 If Congress identifies a problem
in the legislative record, the next question is whether the
purported legislation imposes disproportionate substantive
requirements on the states as compared with the unconstitutional
conduct targeted by the legislation.
In other words, Congress can only act under the Fourteenth
Amendment if it shows a widespread pattern of constitutional
violation by the states exists.9 0 Congress and the courts must assess
the alleged "constitutional violation" under the same standard of
review used to measure the legitimacy of state action. T9 Where the
discriminatory basis of the state action is not a suspect classification
under the Equal Protection Clause, states may discriminate without
offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the states rationally relate
the classification to a legitimate state interest. 92 Congress cannot
prohibit substantially more state practices under the Fourteenth
Amendment than would likely be upheld under the applicable
standard of review.)9 This is because Congress could then target
constitutional conduct by the state, a broader power than
forbidding and preventing states from acting in an unconstitutional
manner.
186. See id. at 644-45.
187. See id. at 645.
188. See id. (explaining how the test was applied in Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531).
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 646 (explaining age is not a suspect classification under the
Equal Protection Clause and must be reviewed on a rational basis test, while state

discrimination on the basis of race or gender requires "a tighter fit between the
discriminatory means and the legitimate ends they serve").
192. See id.
193.
194.

See id.at 647.
See id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol26/iss4/12

22

2000]

Senkbeil: A Survey of Recent Developments in the Law: Constitutional Law
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

1257

With respect to the ADEA, the Court found the substantive
requirements it imposed on state and local governments were
disproportionate to any unconstitutional conduct Congress could
conceivably target. 195 The Court first noted that under prior case
law, age is not a suspect classification under the Fourteenth
116
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
Therefore, states may
discriminate on the basis of age if such classification is "rationally
related" to a legitimate state interest. 97 The Court reasoned that
because the ADEA "prohibits substantially more state employment
decisions... than would likely be held unconstitutional under the
applicable equal protection, rational basis standard," it is out of
proportion to a remedial objective and cannot be understood to be
responsive to or designed to prevent unconstitutional behavior. 98
Congress may still enact "reasonably prophylactic legislation" under
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment,'" but that legislation
must appropriately remedy a defined evil among the states, not
"merely an attempt to substantively redefine the states' legal
obligations .... 2 0 0
Looking at the legislative history of the ADEA, the Court noted
Congress did not identify a pattern of age discrimination by the
states, or any discrimination that would rise to the level of a
constitutional violation.201 The Court found the legislative record
contained only a few statements regarding states' discriminatory
practices 202on the basis of age, not enough to infer a national
problem.
Therefore, Congress did not have any reason to believe
the ADEA was necessary to remedy age discrimination in state
government. 2°3 The lack of such evidence led the Court to hold
Congress did not validly exercise its power under section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment when it made the ADEA applicable to
204
states.

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

See id. at 645.
See id.
at 646.
See id.
See id.
at 647.
See id.
at 648.
Id.
See id.at 649.
See id.
See id. at 649-50.
See id.at 650.
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F. Eighth CircuitInterpretation:Whether or not Congress Makes Findings
of PervasiveDiscrimination,Its Actions Under the Fourteenth
Amendment are Limited to the "Mischiefand Wrong" that Amendment
was Intended to Prevent
205

In Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle
the Eighth Circuit ruled that
Congress did not validly abrogate state immunity when it enacted
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 2° Alsbrook
sued the City of Maumelle, the State of Arkansas, and the Arkansas
Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training
(ACLEST) for violating Title II of the ADA.2°7
ACLEST, an agency of the State of Arkansas, regulates the
hiring and certification of law enforcement officials within
208
Arkansas.
Applicants who want certification as law enforcement
officers in Arkansas must meet ACLEST's minimum standards,
including demonstrating that they Possess "visual acuity that can be
corrected to 20/20 in each eye.
Alsbrook wished to become
210
certified by ACLEST and obtain a job in law enforcement.
However, Alsbrook had a congenital condition that prevented him
from meeting the minimum visual acuity standard because the
vision in his right eye could only be corrected to 20/30. 21 Because
of this condition, Alsbrook was denied employment as a law
enforcement officer with the City of Little Rock Police
Department.212

Alsbrook sued under Title II of the ADA arguing that the
defendants failed to certify him because of his disability or because
they regarded him as disabled. 23 Title II of the ADA provides that

205. 184 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1999). On January 25, 2000, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether Congress effectively abrogated state
sovereign immunity. See Alsbrook v. Arkansas, 120 S. Ct. 1003 (2000) (mem.).
However, the case settled and was dismissed before briefs were filed. See Alsbrook
v. Arkansas, 120 S. Ct. 1265 (2000) (mem.).
206. See Alsbrook, 184 F.3d at 1002.
207. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994).
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See id. Alsbrook suffered from amblyopia. See id.
212. See id. at 1003. Alsbrook later obtained a waiver and, by the time the case
was decided, obtained employment as a law enforcement officer with the City of
Little Rock Police Department. See id. Therefore, the Eighth Circuit considered
only his claim for money damages. See id. at 1003 n.5.
213. See id. at 1003. Alsbrook also sued the individual ACLEST commissioners
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public entities may not exclude "qualified individuals" with
disabilities from participation in or denying benefits of the services,
programs or activities of a public entity and further forbids
"discrimination by any such entity. '' 214 The defendants moved for
summary judgment, arguing Congress did not validly abrogate
their Eleventh Amendment immunity. 5 In an en banc decision, the
216
Eighth Circuit agreed.
Because Congress' power to abrogate
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity is limited, the court noted it
need "exercise care before finding abrogation. " 21' The court then
employed
the two-prong analysis set forth in Seminole Tribe v.
218
Florida.

In the first prong of the analysis, the Eighth Circuit easily
found Congress "unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the
immunity .. .,,219 The ADA itself provides that "[a] State shall not
be immune under the eleventh amendment... from an action in
Federal or State
court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of
220
this chapter.,

The court next considered the second prong of the analysiswhether Congress acted pursuant to a valid exercise of power. 221
The essence of the question, the court determined, is whether
"Title II of the ADA represents a proper exercise of Congress'
Section 5 powers 'to enforce' by 'appropriate legislation' the
constitutional guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, in
particular, the Equal Protection Clause."222 If Title II exceeds
Congress' enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment,
Congress does not have jurisdictional effect and cannot
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his rights under Title II of the ADA. See id.
The Court determined that because Alsbrook could not sue the individuals under
Title II of the ADA, he could not maintain an action against them under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. See id. at 1012.
214. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994); see also Alsbrook, 184 F.3d at 1003 n.4.
215. SeeAlsbrook, 184 F.3d at 1003.
216. See id. at 1004. (vacating the panel's decision found at 156 F.3d 825 (8th
Cir. 1998) and reversing the district court's denial of summary judgment).
217. See id. at 1005 (stating the Supreme Court has cautioned care be
exercised in reading its decision in Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
234, 238 (1985)).
218. See id. (stating it must engage a two-prong analysis to determine the
validity of Congress' abrogation of immunity and citing Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996)).
219. See id.
220. See id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (1994)).
221. See id. at 1006.
222. Id. (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517 (1996)).
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2
constitutionally abrogate states' immunity. 1
The Eighth Circuit explained that under Boerne, Congress'
enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment is limited
to enacting remedial legislation, and Congress has no authority to
enact substantive legislation defining the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment.224 In determining whether Title II of the ADA is
remedial legislation, the Eighth Circuit considered Alsbrook's
argument that "Congress made detailed findings.., of a serious
and pervasive problem of discrimination against the disabled,"
which the ADA was designed to remedy. 225 The court did not
disagree, but stated that "the legislative record, alone, cannot
suffice to bring Title II within... Congress' Section 5
[enforcement] powers .... ,226
Instead, even if the legislative
record contains detailed findings, Congress may still not pass
legislation that "attempts to expand, enhance or add to the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment" 2 7 because it "only has
the power
that which the Fourteenth Amendment
..
.
,,228to prohibit
prohibits.
The court opined that "congressional enforcement of
equal protection rights under [the Fourteenth Amendment] is not
limited to suspect classifications," and the court must look to "what
kind of discrimination the Constitution prohibits, and whether the

ADA was aimed at that kind of discrimination." 229 The
r 230 Supreme

Court in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., held that
state classifications based on mental
retardation need
only satisfy
•
.
231
rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause.
Therefore, disability discrimination under the Fourteenth
223. See id. (quoting Brown v. North Carolina Div. of Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d
698, 703 (4th Cir. 1999)).
224. See id. at 1007 (citing Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1008. Later in the opinion, the court acknowledged that "Congress
may prohibit conduct which itself is not necessarily unconstitutional, if to do so
would rectify an existing constitutional violation." Id. at 1009. However, it found
the legislative record inadequate to support the "proposition that most state
programs and services discriminate arbitrarily against the disabled." Id. Thus, the
court concluded that Title II was not enacted to counteract state laws or state
actions that violate the Constitution. See id.
227. Id. at 1008.
228. Id.
229. Id. It is interesting to note that the Eighth Circuit applied this
methodology before it was enunciated by the Supreme Court in Kimel v. Florida
Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
230. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
231. See Alsbrook, 184 F.3d at 1009.
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Amendment must satisfy only the lower rational basis review,
allowing states to discriminate on the basis of disability if the
distinctions it makes are based on legitimate governmental
232
objectives.
Title II of the ADA, the court stated, imposes a higher
standard of conduct on states than the Fourteenth Amendment
requires.2" Because Title II applies a higher standard, in adopting
Title II of the ADA, Congress did not act to enforce equal protection
guarantees for the disabled as defined by the Supreme Court, but
to define them substantively. 214 Thus, Congress exceeded its
authority when it passed Title II of the ADA under the Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement clause and did not effectively abrogate
215
state sovereign immunity.
G. Conclusion
The current majority has applied their federalism principles
narrowly to construe Congress' power to override state immunity
from suit. Legislation enacted under Article I to abrogate state
sovereign immunity (in either federal or state court) is invalid. Nor
can Congress stretch the substantive limits of the Fourteenth
Amendment. For the first time, the Court is applying the same
standard in determining whether state law violates the Fourteenth
Amendment and determining whether Congressional legislation is
"appropriate" when it attempts to subject states to suit under
Fourteenth Amendment legislation. The majority has stated its
new precedence is "firmly established.' 2 36 However, the Court's
majority is narrow and the area is unsettled. Further changes in
the makeup of the Court may result in more unsettled law in this
area. Stay tuned.
Mary L. Senkbeil

232. See id.
233. See id. Title II requires states to provide modifications to its services,
programs and activities unless they would fundamentally alter the nature of the
service, program or activity. See id. This is more than is required under the
rational basis review standard for Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Claims, which requires only a legitimate governmental objective. See id.

234.

Seeid. at 1010.

235.
236.

See id.
See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 643 (2000).
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